Contents
- Military-Feudal Imperialism
- Capitalist Famine
- Two Paths of Capitalist Development
- On the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Bourgeois Revolution
- The Highest Stage of Capitalism
- Stalin’s and Plekhanov’s Social-Chauvinism
- LENINISM AND IMPERIALIST WAR
Analysis of the Development of Capitalism and Revolutionary Strategy
The article presented here was originally conceived as a conceptual preface to a book, still unpublished, on the history of the spread of Marxism in Russia and the formation of the first proletarian organisations, which we were preparing for the centenary of the October Revolution.
The true history of the workers’ movement is inconceivable without a rigorous analysis of its material basis. For this very reason, the central task of the research was to examine the objective socio-economic conditions of the Russian Empire at the turn of the twentieth century – the actual historical foundation from which the Bolshevik Party organically emerged and on which it rested.
Without a clear understanding of the specific character of Russian capitalism, closely interwoven with the remnants of serfdom, it is impossible to understand why Lenin’s revolutionary strategy proved to be the only correct one, while its political opponents inevitably lapsed into opportunism.
Today, when mountains of ideological rubbish have accumulated around the history of the revolutionary movement, it is particularly important to dissect the persistent myths that distort the actual class alignment of forces on the eve of 1917.
This work exposes the striking class affinity between the positions of the social-chauvinist Plekhanov and the social-imperialist Stalin – the future embodiment of the counter-revolution – in their denial of the independently imperialist character of Russian capitalism.
By examining the anatomy of Russian military-feudal imperialism, the article demonstrates that Lenin’s uncompromising line of advocating the defeat of his own government in the world slaughter and the transformation of the bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution was not a voluntarist leap, but a rigorous scientific conclusion arising from Russia’s objective position within the world capitalist system.
In 1924, in his work The Foundations of Leninism, J. V. Stalin wrote that «Tsarist Russia was a major reserve of Western imperialism», its «watchdog» and «agent». Clearly, these assessments implied that the Russian Empire occupied a dependent, subordinate position in relation to the Western powers. In that case, it would indeed follow that the 14-million-strong Russian army was shedding its blood «to safeguard the staggering profits of the British and French capitalists»1. The interests of Russian imperialism, meanwhile, were relegated to the background, at the very least.
In his article On Lenin’s Theses and Why Nonsense Is Sometimes Interesting, written in April 1917, G. V. Plekhanov, in his characteristically brilliant literary style, invoked Chekhov’s Ward No. 6 and Gogol’s Diary of a Madman in an attempt to demolish Lenin’s April Theses, calling upon Marx – who never actually became a lawyer – to act as an arbitrator. Plekhanov argued that Lenin shifted responsibility from people to relations of production, and demanded proof «that responsibility for each and every imperialist war falls equally upon all the capitalist countries participating in it»2. Without troubling himself to provide any such proof, Plekhanov declared that Lenin’s theses «have no trace of Marxism about them […] just as there is no trace of it in the arguments of people who take no account of the conditions of time and place»3. He confined himself to the assertion that «Russia does not belong among» the countries «which have reached the highest stage of the capitalist mode of production»4. On this basis, Plekhanov concluded that the Russian proletariat should support the “defensive” war waged first by the Tsarist government and subsequently by the Provisional Government.
There are undoubtedly differences between the conclusions of the political leader of the USSR – a state in which, according to the ideologues of the bourgeoisie, scientific communism supposedly prevailed – and those of Plekhanov, the first Russian Marxist. Nevertheless, Lenin’s revolutionary strategy was unacceptable to both. The former opposed it covertly, the latter openly. This difference should not mislead us, since it stemmed from the conditions of time and place in which Stalin and Plekhanov found themselves.
What, then, was Russian capitalism really like? Had it reached the imperialist stage of development by the time of the First World War?
Military-Feudal Imperialism
As early as the late nineteenth century, while pointing to Russia’s «tremendous peculiarities […] in both the economic and non-economic spheres»5 – the essence of which lay above all in the fact that «in no single capitalist country has there been such an abundant survival of ancient institutions that are incompatible with capitalism»6 – V. I. Lenin nevertheless emphasised the similarity between the fundamental features of capitalist development in Russia and those in the countries of Western Europe:
«Capitalist evolution has not only introduced similarity in the general economic system of West-European countries, but it has brought Russia also closer to the West».7
Consequently, Russia’s distinctive features were merely a manifestation of an earlier stage of capitalist development, while its differences from the Western European states were quantitative rather than qualitative.
The economist P. I. Lyashchenko (1875–1955), in his work The History of the National Economy of the USSR, discussing the economic policy of the Tsarist regime, wrote:
«The entire economic, taxation, budgetary, financial and credit policy of the state, which favoured the development of capitalist industry; its entire foreign trade and customs policy; its railway tariff policy; its entire foreign policy; and all its relations with international capital were directed towards protecting the interests of the bourgeoisie and developing capitalist industry in the country. But these objectives often came into conflict with the class policy of the autocracy – its patronage of the landowning nobility».8
We can characterise the situation that had developed in Russia by that time as a crisis of incongruity: the outdated feudal political form was incompatible with the new bourgeois content.
The historian I. F. Gindin (1900–1980), in his work The State Bank and the Economic Policy of the Tsarist Government (1861–1892), does not dwell on the conflict of interests between the nobility and the bourgeoisie. Instead, he points out that «the preservation and consolidation of the political dominance of the serf-owning landed nobility […] was possible only on condition that the country experienced economic growth and continued to advance along the path of capitalism. Moreover, the very prolongation of the historical existence of semi-serf latifundia became possible only through their integration into the country’s capitalist development and a certain restructuring of these latifundia along capitalist lines». This is why «despite all the contradictions and inconsistencies of the Tsarist government’s economic policy, the promotion of capitalist development became its principal direction».9
Alexander Gerschenkron (1904–1978), an American historian and economist born in Odessa, adds that «a good deal of the governments’s interest in industrialization was predicated upon its military policy»10. And that is not all:
«The state, moved by its military interest, assumed the role of the primary agent propelling the economic progress in the country».11
The impetus for this revolution from above, carried out by the autocratic government, came from the military defeat in the Crimean War and the diplomatic defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. Gerschenkron and another American specialist in Russian history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Theodore H. von Laue (1916–2000), argued that Russia’s industrialisation – an attempt to make a “great leap” in industrial development – contradicted the autocracy’s agrarian policy and was carried out at the expense of the countryside. In this respect, they differed from Gindin, who saw an interpenetration of interests between large-scale landownership – which was increasingly oriented towards the market and thus becoming capitalist – and industrial capital.
The unity of the military-political and economic interests of Russia’s industrial and agrarian capitalism enabled Lenin, in 1915, to argue that the proletarian party should draw the “non-proletarian masses of the people” into the struggle «to take part in liberating bourgeois Russia from military-feudal “imperialism” (tsarism)», adding that «the proletariat will at once utilise this ridding of bourgeois Russia of tsarism and the rule of the landowners […] to bring about the socialist revolution in alliance with the proletarians of Europe»12.
From his analysis of the development of capitalism, Lenin drew conclusions about the concrete tasks of revolutionary strategy.
Capitalist Famine
The facts would seem to bear out the position of the American historians. In the second half of the nineteenth century, grain came to occupy a dominant position in Russian exports. By the mid-1870s, it accounted for 50 per cent of exports, and this share, despite constant fluctuations, remained at roughly the same level until the beginning of the twentieth century13.
In 1891–1892, Russia was struck by two devastating crop failures (the grain harvest fell by 45 per cent14), which drove up grain prices and led to famine. The Minister of the Interior, I. N. Durnovo (1834–1903), proposed restricting the free trade in grain and its export abroad, as well as urgently establishing a single government body responsible for grain procurement. The Council of Ministers, however, opposed these measures, unwilling to infringe upon the interests of exporters – capitalist landowners with large estates15. Grain exports increased by a quarter. It was no coincidence that the famous saying arose:
«A poor harvest is sent by God, but famine is brought by the Tsar!»16
Rosa Luxemburg called this famine «the Golgotha of the Russian village». It was followed by «the second of the apocalyptic horsemen», an epidemic of cholera17. The governor of Baku fled to the mountains, the governor of Saratov took refuge aboard a steamer, while the governor of Astrakhan sent patrol ships into the Caspian Sea to block the passage of «spreaders of the disease». As a result, 10,000 people were condemned to die from the epidemic, hunger and thirst. Cholera riots broke out. These events are recounted in In the Year of Cholera, a book by the Russian writer V. G. Korolenko (1853–1921).
Estimates of the total demographic losses caused by famine and the epidemic vary. We shall cite the estimate of the American researcher R. Robbins18, who analysed mortality statistics for the 17 provinces most severely affected by famine. In 1892, the mortality rate stood at 4.81 per cent, compared with an average of 3.76 per cent for the decade 1881–1890 – that is, it was 28 per cent above the normal level. Excess mortality in the famine-stricken area in 1892, from all causes, amounted to 406,000 people. Robbins estimates that cholera alone claimed at least 100,000 lives.
But it was not, of course, the latifundists or the kulaks who were going hungry. The process of the disintegration of the peasantry was well under way, and the countryside therefore cannot be regarded as a homogeneous whole. Capitalist development, on the one hand, gave rise to a symbiosis between rural and urban capitalists, while, on the other, it condemned millions of the poorest peasants and urban proletarians to destitution, intensifying the contradiction between labour and capital.
Two Paths of Capitalist Development
On 16 December 1909, in a letter to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov (1870–1928), a Bolshevik and one of the longest-standing participants in the Russian revolutionary movement, Lenin pointed out that «the development of agrarian relations in Russia is proceeding on capitalist lines both in landlord and in peasant economy, both outside and within the “village commune”»19, that «by 1905 the bourgeois development of Russia had already matured sufficiently to require the immediate break-up of the antiquated superstructure […]. We are now living in the period of this break-up, which various classes of bourgeois Russia are trying to complete, to consummate in their own way».20 On this basis, he concluded that «we cannot halt at a general solution of the problem of capitalism [when we were fighting against the Narodniks]. Now, however, this question has been settled both in theory and in reality. […] and another, higher question has taken its place: capitalism of type α or capitalism of type β».21
It was precisely in reflecting on the distinctive features of Russia’s capitalist evolution in comparison with the advanced countries of Western Europe – that is, on the type of capitalism – that Lenin formulated his thesis concerning two possible paths of development: the “American” and the “Prussian”.
«Beginning with Two Tactics (1905) and continuing with numerous articles in newspapers and miscellanies of 1906 and 1907 we have consistently given the following grounds: the bourgeois development of Russia is now a foregone conclusion but it is possible in two forms – the so-called “Prussian” form (the retention of the monarchy and landlordism, the creation of a strong, i.e., bourgeois, peasantry on the given historical basis, etc.) and the so called “American” form (a bourgeois republic, the abolition of landlordism, the creation of a farmer class, i.e., of a free bourgeois peasantry, by means of a marked change of the given historical situation)».22
Drawing once again on his analysis of capitalist development, Lenin arrived at a concrete conclusion:
«This agrarian question is now the national question of bourgeois development in Russia».23
Thus, «the proletariat must fight for the second path as offering the greatest degree of freedom and speed of development of the productive forces of capitalist Russia, and victory in this struggle is possible only with a revolutionary alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry».24
The Third of June Monarchy represented an attempt to set Russia’s capitalist development on the Prussian path. On 2 December 1909, in a letter to the same I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, Lenin concluded that although «Stolypin’s agrarian policy is correct from the point of view of Bismarckianism», and «Struve, Guchkov and Stolypin are trying their hardest to “copulate” and produce a Bismarckian Russia – but nothing comes of it. […] Stolypin himself “asks” for 20 years». However, «twenty years, and even a shorter time, is impossible in Russia without 1830–1848–1871 (if in the French style) and 1863–1865 (if in the German style)», that is, without the “general-democratic onset” of a Jacobin revolution from below or a “rotten” Prussian revolution from above.25 Yet «neither of the agrarian paths has won so far»; «the struggle» between revolution and counter-revolution «is still going on», and its outcome remains uncertain.26 Consequently, it was entirely possible that the defeat of the revolution would have resulted in the triumph of the “Prussian” type of development, leaving the proletarian party with no alternative but to fight «for the destruction of capitalism itself»27. This is precisely why «we should not link the destinies of the proletarian party with the success or failure of the bourgeois revolution». The party must remain strong «whatever the turn events take». And during the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the Bolsheviks «are obliged to do our duty as leaders of a […] “general-democratic” movement right to the end, until the Russian 1871, until the complete turn of the peasantry to the side of an Ordnungspartei28. And such a turn, as far as Russia is concerned, is still a long way off!».29
History, however, left the autocracy no time to pursue the Prussian path. The world stood on the brink of the First World Imperialist War.
On the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Bourgeois Revolution
As early as April 1907, Lenin, taking as his starting point the dependent position of the big capitalists and their ties to the autocracy, pointed out that in Russia «the bourgeois revolution under the leadership of the bourgeoisie can only be an unconsummated revolution (i.e., strictly speaking, not revolution but reform). It can be a real revolution only under the leadership of the proletariat and the peasantry»30.
This conclusion underlay the difference between the Bolsheviks’ and Mensheviks’ assessments of the tasks of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution: the Mensheviks regarded the bourgeoisie as the driving force of the revolution. Lenin described their position in no other terms than as «a falsification of Marxism»31 and «a defection from Marxism to liberalism»32. This position turned «Marxism, a “guide to action”, into a dead letter»33, since it ignored the fact that the alliance between the big bourgeoisie and the landowners was leading to the further entrenchment of military-feudal imperialism in Russia.
Recognising this, Rosa Luxemburg, in April–May 1907, pointed to the dual character of the first Russian revolution:
«In its immediate objectives, it is a bourgeois revolution, [but since the proletariat] has not conquered political freedom for the bourgeoisie but, on the contrary, with the objective of facilitating its own struggle against the bourgeoisie, [it is also a proletarian revolution, in which] the struggle against absolutism in this revolution must go hand in hand with the struggle against capital».34
The Highest Stage of Capitalism
In 1915, in his pamphlet Socialism and War, Lenin observed that «in Russia, capitalist imperialism of the latest type has fully revealed itself in the policy of tsarism towards Persia, Manchuria and Mongolia, but, in general, military and feudal imperialism is predominant in Russia»35. In his Notebooks on Imperialism, Lenin classified Russia, alongside France and Japan, as a secondary imperialist power, ranking them below the three principal powers – Britain, Germany and the United States.36 These six countries constituted the great powers of the First World War era. Below them, Lenin placed a “third league” consisting of Italy and Austria-Hungary. All these states participated in the redivision of the world. Russia, in particular, had annexed Bukhara, Khiva and Port Arthur. In 1914, its colonial and dependent territories were home to 33 million people.37
In his fundamental work Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin characterised Russia as «a country most backward economically […], where modern capitalist imperialism is enmeshed, so to speak, in a particularly close network of pre-capitalist relations»38. However, this backwardness was relative to the advanced capitalist countries. At the same time, the fusion of finance capital and industrial capital was also taking place in Russia. For example, the Russo-Asian Bank, whose head office was located on Nevsky Prospekt, controlled 22 per cent of oil production, exercised considerable influence over the military-industrial complex, controlled 163 industrial enterprises across the country and, on the eve of the war, had acquired all the largest tobacco factories. Monopolies were also emerging, including “Produgol” and “Prodamet”, as well as syndicates in the oil, metallurgical and cement industries.
The German researcher K. Funken, who devoted an entire book to “proving” the absence of the economic prerequisites for the October Revolution, wrote, contradicting himself, that «it would be incorrect to characterise Tsarist Russia as a colonial country, defencelessly exposed to the influence of imperialist metropolises […]. In terms of its socio-economic status, Tsarist Russia was not a country like India or China; in the decades preceding the World War, it occupied a strong international position in the mining, metalworking and textile industries. Leaving aside the textile industry, production in all these sectors was carried out at a high technical level, with a high organic composition of capital and a very high degree of concentration».39
The large Russian landowners and the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie supported the Tsarist regime’s military policy, anticipating enormous material gains and privileges from the partition of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires and calculating in advance the profits they would reap in the event of victory for the Tsarist army.
Broad sections of the urban “middle” bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intelligentsia, members of the liberal professions and others were also infected with chauvinism. The Russian liberal bourgeoisie gave its wholehearted support to the autocratic government, while Pan-Slavism – an instrument of Tsarist diplomacy – became the official ideology of the Cadet Party.
Even before the war, Lenin had written that «the Cadets have been blaming the wildest nationalist reactionaries not for their imperialism, but on the contrary for minimising the weight and the importance of the “great” idea of the tsarist conquest of Constantinople».40
Chauvinism also permeated the bourgeois-democratic parties:
«Mr. Plekhanov, the ex-socialist, has tried to make out that the Russian reactionaries are generally in favour of peace with Germany, whereas the “progressive bourgeoisie” are in favour of crushing “Prussian militarism” and support friendship with “democratic” England. That is a fairytale suitable to the mental level of political infants. The fact is that tsarism and all the Russian reactionaries and the “progressive” bourgeoisie (Octobrists and Cadets) want the same thing: rob Germany, Austria and Turkey in Europe, and defeat England in Asia (so as to take the whole of Persia, Mongolia, Tibet, etc.). These “dear friends” disagree only as to when and how to turn from a struggle against Germany to a struggle against England».41
Thus, unlike Stalin, who grossly underestimated the strength of Russian imperialism, reducing Russia to a semi-colonial position – a view characteristic of social-patriots – Lenin recognised that Russian peasants and workers, clad in soldiers’ greatcoats, were shedding their blood on the battlefields of the First World War not so much in the interests of Anglo-French capitalists as in the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie and Tsarism. On this basis, he drew the following conclusion:
«The imperialist war has linked up the Russian revolutionary crisis, which stems from a bourgeois-democratic revolution, with the growing crisis of the proletarian socialist revolution in the West. This link is so direct that no individual solution of revolutionary problems is possible in any single country – the Russian bourgeois democratic revolution is now not only a prologue to, but an indivisible and integral part of, the socialist revolution in the West».42
Stalin’s and Plekhanov’s Social-Chauvinism
The concept of Russia’s “semi-colonial dependence”, which had become an unquestionable dogma in the USSR by the mid-1930s, has its roots in Stalin’s work The Foundations of Leninism. In this work, devoted to the “Leninist Recruitment Drive”, which marked a step towards the destruction of the Bolshevik Party, Stalin confirmed his break with Leninism and proletarian internationalism. He thereby demonstrated unequivocally that the line of critically supporting the Provisional Government and overcoming disagreements within a united Social Democratic Party with the Mensheviks, pursued by the Pravda under his leadership in March 1917, was no mere accidental error, but rather reflected the genuine political position of one of the architects of the imperialist carve-up at Yalta.
As for Plekhanov, even if L. D. Trotsky, in his capacity as the first People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, had not published the secret treaties of the Allied powers, a Marxist need only have considered the objective logic of capitalist development, which inevitably drives states into a struggle for foreign markets and spheres of influence, to understand that it is this very logic, rather than individual states, let alone individual personalities, that makes imperialist wars inevitable at a certain stage in the development of capitalism. By that time, however, Plekhanov had abandoned Marxism and joined the ranks of the chauvinists, alongside Kautsky in Germany, Guesde in France, and others. Descending into vulgar sophistry, he argued:
«[…] if one of two opposing parties displays predatory intentions, it is quite natural to assume that the other risks being robbed. It follows that Germany was in danger of being robbed by Russia. […] Who does not know that it was not Russia that declared war on Germany, but Germany that declared war on Russia?»43
Lenin had already pilloried this kind of reasoning at the very beginning of the First World War with his famous assertion that, as far as the proletariat was concerned, it made absolutely no difference which of the two robbers drew his knife first.
September 2015
LENINISM AND IMPERIALIST WAR
In this appendix, we shall present several quotations from Lenin’s works which require no further comment and expose the position of Plekhanov, Kautsky, Guesde and other erstwhile Marxists who, with the outbreak of the imperialist bloodbath, supported their governments and went over to the side of the class enemy.
«We all expected this imperialist war, and prepared for it. And if this is so, it is not at all important who attacked first; all were preparing for the war, and the attacker was the one who thought it most advantageous to do so at the particular moment».
Lenin V. I. Lecture on “The Proletariat and the War”. Newspaper Report // Collected Works. Volume 36. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966. P. 301.
«We know that, for decades, three robbers (the bourgeoisie and the governments of Britain, Russia and France) were arming to pillage Germany. Is there anything surprising that two robbers began the attack before the other three got the new knives they had ordered? Is it not a sophism for phrases about “who started the war” to be used to gloss over the equal “guilt” of the bourgeoisie of all countries, which was unanimously recognised without question by all socialists at Basle?»
Lenin V. I. The Russian Brand of Südekum // Collected Works. Volume 21. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964. P. 121.
«Perhaps the most primitive of these is the “who-started-it?” theory, which may be worded as follows: we have been attacked and are defending ourselves; the interests of the proletariat demand that the violators of the peace in Europe should be properly dealt with. This is merely a rehash of the declarations made by all governments and of the outcries of the bourgeois and the gutter press all over the world. Plekhanov embellishes even this threadbare piece of vulgarity with his inevitable Jesuitical reference to “dialectics”: to be able to assess the concrete situation, he says, we must first of all find out who started it and punish him […].
[…] Plekhanov has set a new record in the noble sport of substituting sophistry for dialectics. The sophist grabs at one of many “arguments”; it was Hegel who long ago very properly observed that “arguments” can be found to prove anything in the world. Dialectics calls for a many-sided investigation into a given social phenomenon in its development, and for the external and the seeming to be reduced to the fundamental motive forces, to the development of the productive forces and to the class struggle. Plekhanov has plucked out a quotation from the German Social-Democratic press: the Germans themselves, before the war, admitted that Austria and Germany had “started it”, he says, and there you are. He does not mention the fact that the Russian socialists repeatedly exposed the tsarist plans of conquest of Galicia, Armenia, etc. He does not make the slightest attempt to study the economic and diplomatic history of at least the past three decades, which history proves conclusively that the conquest of colonies, the looting of foreign countries, the ousting and ruining of the more successful rivals have been the backbone of the politics of both groups of the now belligerent powers. With reference to wars, the main thesis of dialectics, which has been so shamelessly distorted by Plekhanov to please the bourgeoisie, is that “war is simply the continuation of politics by other [i.e., violent] means”. Such is the formula of Clausewitz, one of the greatest writers on the history of war, whose thinking was stimulated by Hegel. And it was always the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded any war as the continuation of the politics of the powers concerned – and the various classes within these countries – in a definite period».
Lenin V. I. The Collapse of the Second International // Collected Works. Volume 21. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964. P. 217–219.
«If a German under Wilhelm or a Frenchman under Clemenceau says, “It is my right and duty as a socialist to defend my country if it is invaded by an enemy”, lie argues not like a socialist, not like an internationalist, not like a revolutionary proletarian, but like a petty-bourgeois nationalist. Because this argument ignores the revolutionary class struggle of the workers against capital, it ignores the appraisal of the war as a whole from the point of view of the world bourgeoisie and the world proletariat, that is, it ignores internationalism, and all that remains is miserable and narrow-minded nationalism. My country is being wronged, that is all I care about – that is what this argument amounts to, and that is where its petty-bourgeois, nationalist narrow-mindedness lies. It is the same as if in regard to individual violence, violence against an individual, one were to argue that socialism is opposed to violence and therefore I would rather be a traitor than go to prison. The Frenchman, German or Italian who says: “Socialism is opposed to violence against nations, therefore I defend myself when my country is invaded”, betrays socialism and internationalism, because such a man sees only his own “country”, he puts “his own”… bourgeoisie above everything else and does not give a thought to the international connections which make the war an imperialist war and his bourgeoisie a link in the chain of imperialist plunder. All philistines and all stupid and ignorant yokels argue in the same way as the renegade Kautsky supporters, Longuet supporters, Turati and Co.: “The enemy has invaded my country, I don’t care about anything else”».
Lenin V. I. The Proletarian Revolution And The Renegade Kautsky // Collected Works. Volume 28. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965. P. 285–286.
Footnotes
-
- Stalin J. V. The Foundations of Leninism. Lectures Delivered at the Sverdlov University // Works. Volume 6. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953. P. 77. ↩
-
- Oktiabrskii perevorot: Revoliutsiia 1917 goda glazami ee rukovoditelei. Vospominaniia russkikh politikov i kommentarii zapadnogo istorika [The October Coup: The 1917 Revolution Through the Eyes of Its Leaders. Memoirs of Russian Politicians and Commentary by a Western Historian]. Moscow: Sovremennik, 1991. P. 172. (in Rus.) ↩
-
- Ibid. P. 174. ↩
-
- Ibid. P. 173. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. The Development of Capitalism in Russia. The Process of the Formation of a Home Market for Large-Scale Industry // Collected Works. Volume 3. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977. P. 27. ↩
-
- Ibid. P. 600. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. The Agrarian Question and the “Critics of Marx” // Collected Works. Volume 5. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961. P. 188. ↩
-
- Lyashchenko P. I. Istoriia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR [A History of the National Economy of the USSR]. Vol. II. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1952. Pp. 175–176. (in Rus.) ↩
-
- Gindin I. F. Gosudarstvennyi bank i ekonomicheskaia politika tsarskogo pravitelstva [The State Bank and the Economic Policy of the Tsarist Government]. Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1960. Pp. 17–18. (in Rus.) ↩
-
- Gerschenkron A. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. A Book of Essays. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962. P. 20. ↩
-
- Ibid. P. 17. ↩
-
Lenin V. I. On the Two Lines of the Revolution // Collected Works. Volume 21. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964. P. 420. ↩
-
- Bovykin V. I. Finansovyi kapital v Rossii nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny [Finance Capital in Russia on the Eve of the First World War]. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001. P. 32. (in Rus.) ↩
-
- Riazanov V. T. Ekonomicheskoe razvitie Rossii. XIX–XX vv. [The Economic Development of Russia in the 19th and 20th Centuries]. St Petersburg: Nauka, 1998. P. 321. (in Rus.) ↩
-
- Sokolov N. P. Golod 1891–1892 godov i obshchestvenno-politicheskaia borba v Rossii [The Famine of 1891–1892 and the Socio-Political Struggle in Russia]. Moscow: s.n., 1987. Pp. 11–12. (in Rus.) ↩
-
- Obolenskii V. A. Ocherki minuvshego [Sketches of the Past]. Belgrade: Russkaia tipografiia, 1931. P. 197. (in Rus.) ↩
-
- Luxemburg R. Life of Korolenko // International Socialist Review. Vol. 30. No. 1. January-February 1969. ↩
-
- Robbins R. G. Jr. Famine in Russia, 1891–1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. Letter to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, December 16, 1909 // Collected Works. Volume 16. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963. P. 118. ↩
-
- Ibid. P. 121. ↩
-
- Ibid. P. 119. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. Some Sources of the Present Ideological Discord // Collected Works. Volume 16. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963. P. 87–88. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. Letter to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, December 16, 1909 // Collected Works. Volume 16. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963. P. 120. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. Some Sources of the Present Ideological Discord // Collected Works. Volume 16. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963. P. 88. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. Letter to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, December 2, 1909 // Collected Works. Volume 34. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966. P. 408. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. Letter to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, December 16, 1909 // Collected Works. Volume 16. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963. P. 122. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. Some Sources of the Present Ideological Discord // Collected Works. Volume 16. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963. P. 93. ↩
-
- Party of order (Germ.) ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. Letter to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, December 2, 1909 // Collected Works. Volume 34. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966. P. 409. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. The Strength and Weakness of the Russian Revolution // Collected Works. Volume 12. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972. P. 357. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. The “Leftward Swing” of the Bourgeoisie and the Tasks of the Proletariat // Collected Works. Volume 15. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 19. P. 397. ↩
-
- Ibid. P. 398. ↩
-
- Ibid. P. 399. ↩
-
- Luxemburg R. Chapter Eighteen “The Russian Revolution” (20 December 1905) // Witnesses to Permanent Revolution: The Documentary Record. Edited and translated by Richard B. Day and Daniel Gaido. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009. P. 521–522. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. Socialism and War: The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. toward the War // Collected Works. Volume 21. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964. P. 306. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. Notebooks on Imperialism // Collected Works. Volume 39. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968. P. 202. ↩
-
- Ibid. P. 300. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. A Popular Outline // Collected Works. Volume 22. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964. P. 259. ↩
-
- Funken К. Okonomischen Voraussetzungen der Oktoberrevolution. Zur Entwicklung des Kapitalismus in Russland. Zurich, Frankfurt a. M., 1976. P. 322–323. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. To All the Citizens of Russia // Collected Works. Volume 39. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969. P. 265. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. A Separate Peace // Collected Works. Volume 23. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964. P. 129. ↩
-
- Lenin V. I. The Defeat of Russia and The Revolutionary Crisis // Collected Works. Volume 21. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964. P. 379. ↩
-
- Oktiabrskii perevorot: Revoliutsiia 1917 goda glazami ee rukovoditelei. Vospominaniia russkikh politikov i kommentarii zapadnogo istorika [The October Coup: The 1917 Revolution Through the Eyes of Its Leaders. Memoirs of Russian Politicians and Commentary by a Western Historian]. Moscow: Sovremennik, 1991. P. 173. (in Rus.) ↩